1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
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5	IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ) Master File No. 12-2311 ANTITRUST LITIGATION ) Hon. Marianne O. Battani
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8	FAIRNESS HEARING and MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI United States District Judge
10	Theodore Levin United States Courthouse  231 West Lafayette Boulevard
11	Detroit, Michigan Tuesday, July 14, 2015
12	APPEARANCES:
13	
14	DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS:
15	DAVID H. FINK FINK & ASSOCIATES LAW
16	
17	JOSEPH C. KOHN  KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
18	appaony by wayser
19	GREGORY P. HANSEL PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS, L.L.P.
20	ELICENE A CDECTOR
21	EUGENE A. SPECTOR SPECTOR, ROSEMAN, KODROFF & WILLIS, P.C.
22	STEVEN A. KANNER
23	FREED, KANNER, LONDON & MILLEN, L.L.C.
24	ma abtain a same of this official terroresist services
25	To obtain a copy of this official transcript, contact: Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter (313) 964-3303 • rob_smith@mied.uscourts.gov

1	APPEARANCES: (Continued)
2	END PAYOR PLAINTIFFS:
3	DEVON ALLARD The miller law firm, p.C.
4	THE MIDDER DAW FIRM, F.C.
5	DEFENDANTS:
6	HOWARD B. IWREY
7	DYKEMA GOSSETT, P.L.L.C.
8	JOANNE GEHA SWANSON
9	KERR, RUSSELL & WEBER, P.L.C.
10	ROBERT WIERENGA
11	SCHIFF HARDIN, L.L.P.
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      Detroit, Michigan
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      Tuesday, July 14, 2015
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      at about 1:33 p.m.
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 5
               (Court and Counsel present.)
               THE LAW CLERK:
                               Please rise.
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 7
               The United States District Court for the Eastern
 8
     District of Michigan is now in session, the Honorable
 9
     Marianne O. Battani presiding.
10
               You may be seated.
11
               THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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               THE ATTORNEYS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: This is a much more manageable crowd,
14
     isn't it?
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                      I'd like to put the appearances on the
               Okay.
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     record first. Plaintiffs.
               MR. FINK: Your Honor, David Fink, on behalf of
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18
     direct purchaser plaintiffs.
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               MR. KOHN: Joseph Kohn on behalf of direct
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     purchasers.
               MR. HANSEL: Greg Hansel, for direct purchasers
21
22
     Your Honor.
23
               MR. SPECTOR: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
24
     Gene Spector for direct purchasers.
25
               MR. KANNER: Good afternoon, Judge. Steve Kanner
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1
     on behalf of direct purchasers.
 2
                           Okay.
                                 Are you lonesome?
              THE COURT:
 3
              MR. IWREY:
                           Hello. Howard Iwrey for the TRW
     defendants, now known as ZF TRW.
 4
                                 Anybody else for defendants?
 5
              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
     have a couple names here. Devon Allard?
6
 7
              MR. ALLARD: Devon Allard for end payors.
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              MR. SWANSON: And Joanne Swanson, Your Honor,
9
     observing on behalf of a number of our clients today;
10
     AutoLiv, Fujikura --
11
              THE COURT: Okay. So you are basically observing?
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              MS. SWANSON: Observing.
13
              THE COURT:
                           Okay. All right.
                                              We have two motions.
14
              MR. WIERENGA: Robert Wierenga observing on behalf
15
     of Takata and TKTA Motors.
16
              THE COURT:
                           Takata.
                                    Okay.
                                           Thank you.
17
              All right.
                           Two motions, the first motion I think
     we should do is the motion for final approval of the TRW
18
19
                  Who's doing that one there?
     settlement.
20
              MR. KOHN:
                          Thank you, Your Honor. May it please
21
     the Court, Joseph Kohn for direct purchasers, in support of
22
     the motion for approval of the settlement. We also as part
23
     of that motion have requested a separate order with respect
24
     to approval of the plan of distribution, and then there is
25
     the other related motion with respect to the request of
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1
     attorneys for fees and costs.
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               We are in our view, and we don't want to go
     overboard with some of these, but at another milestone in the
 3
     sense of another final approval, a second final approval in
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     one of the product cases, and a point where as class counsel
     we can propose a distribution to the class members, and the
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7
     claim form was previously approved by Your Honor in April,
8
     and was attached to the notice that was sent to the class
9
     members.
10
               We are also happy --
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               THE COURT: I do have a question on that.
12
               MR. KOHN:
                          Sure.
13
               THE COURT: So on this distribution, so they would
14
     be able to -- I take it there's going to be multiple
15
     distributions to the same people; is that right?
16
               MR. KOHN:
                          We certainly hope so, yes.
17
               THE COURT: Yes.
18
                          At this point we would distribute --
               MR. KOHN:
19
     yes.
20
               THE COURT:
                           Okay. But you are going to distribute
21
     this one now is what you're saying?
22
                                We think we have reached, if you
               MR. KOHN:
                          Yes.
23
     will, a critical mass such that between the two settlements
24
     in the occupant safety case, the first with AutoLiv and
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     subject to Your Honor's approval with TRW, that it is
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efficient and appropriate to take the next step which is to get the money to the parties that we contend were the injured ones.

Now, if the occupant safety case may continue through trial in which case -- or additional settlements, if we had additional settlements in occupant safety of a sufficient magnitude we would request authorization to distribute in that case, and then the other parts would sort of stand on their own as we reach that kind of threshold number.

And as I said, we are happy to report, and we checked as recently as of today, that there have been no objections from any of the class members to any of the proposals. We always like to see our class member clients and talk to them, but this is one day where we are just as happy we do not see them as objectors.

THE COURT: I take it you have received no mailings or anything from them?

MR. KOHN: There were none that were submitted by the deadline, and the report we filed earlier in July reported that, and again we do check up to the last minute in case they would be out of time under the order and notice at this point.

Your Honor, with respect to the TRW settlement, net of the amount that was returned to the settling defendant

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pursuant to the negotiated agreement on the opt-out
reductions, there is a total amount of $6.5 million.
settlement also provides for the kind of extensive and
detailed cooperation that previously approved settlements in
the other parts as well as AutoLiv have provided for in
exchange for the release of the claims against TRW by the
direct purchasers.
         THE COURT: Okay. And this is the -- the
6.5 million is the new reduction, the new amount; is that
correct?
                    Right. The original face amount, if you
         MR. KOHN:
will, was 8 million. There were three opt-outs and the
opt-outs have been different across the different
settlements, so the OEMs do seem to be making informed and
independent judgments as to each case. Ford is in a separate
category, they have consistently opted out and they have
their own case, at least in the wire harness.
         THE COURT:
                     Who opted out in the wire harness?
         MR. KOHN:
                    Pardon?
         THE COURT: Who opted out?
         MR. KOHN:
                    I think just Ford also with the Lear
settlement, I believe. There may have been another one.
The -- as to this settlement it was BMW, which had previously
remained in the other settlements, Chrysler, which had
previously remained in the other settlements, and Ford.
                                                         So,
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again, in terms of those that have remained in the class, the GMs, the Toyotas, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai, Mercedes are all in this class, and we think that is probably the most significant of the various factors that the Court applies in approving the settlement and, you know, we have briefed this and Your Honor is familiar with those factors in terms of the risk of the case, et cetera, but the reaction of the class members we think is a critical one here where you have sophisticated class members of that kind and description with their own in-house legal staff, their own sub-antitrust departments in their own in-house legal staff, their own outside antitrust counsel, et cetera.

We note in terms of this settlement that it is larger than the guilty plea payment, the guilty plea fine that was paid by TRW, and it is the largest of the private settlements that TRW has reached vis-a-vis the other classes in the case, so the direct purchaser amount is larger.

The stipulated judgment order we recently updated and filed electronically, but I do have paper copies of these various orders if that is also helpful to the Court. We had updated it because the attachment to the proposed order does list the opt-out entities, and while there are more than simply three names, they are within those groups of companies that I mentioned; Ford, BMW and Chrysler.

And, Your Honor, with respect to the plan of

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distribution, we did submit a separate order and, again, we have a paper copy as well as the ones that have been electronically filed, and we discussed the plan of distribution at pages 17 and 18 of our brief in support of the settlement, and it is a relatively simple plan, and it is kind of, you know, ain't broke, don't fix it. There is a pro rata distribution based on the purchases that are reported by the claimants from any of the alleged co-conspirators, so it is not simply if you purchased from TRW, you received funds from the TRW settlement, or if you simply purchased from AutoLiv, but because of the theories of joint and several liability, any purchaser can claim from any of this fund, and that is a tried and true method of distribution in antitrust cases, we do cite a number of them. It was the way the distribution was calculated in the Packaged Iced case, it was in the big Vitamins case, et cetera, et cetera. And I, for one, am not aware of any kind of more elaborate or involved distribution --THE COURT: And you have a limited number, right, there was about -- I can't remember what the number is. There were -- about 1,300 notices were There still were about -- after they did a further mailed. check on the addresses, we had about 240 that were still unreturned or returned as undeliverable, probably from some entities that may have gone out of business or frequently

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they just have changed names or there is a certain amount of duplication in some of those mailings that do go out. that those claims will be received, some have come in already, the claims period is extended. We generally provide a longer period to prepare and file the claim than you do for the opt-out or objection. That expires August 10th, I Claims administrators are on board and they review believe. them, and they sometimes will contact some of the claimants with questions or ask for further backup. They do audit both randomly and audit large claims as a matter of course. then, again, subject to Your Honor's approval and orders, we would be ready to mail out checks soon after that deadline as soon as the claims administrator finishes their work as soon as possible. So with respect again to the settlement, Your Honor, and the plan of distribution, we would request the Court to enter those two orders, and I would also be prepared to address the request of counsel for fees and costs when Your Honor is ready. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Iwrey? Nothing to add for TRW, Your Honor. MR. IWREY: Okay. All right. This settlement with THE COURT: TRW now with the opt-outs is \$6.5 million. The Court notes, as was indicated here in court, that there were some 1,300, I think 1,342 to be exact, notices mailed out, which there were

a couple hundred that came back, but the Court is satisfied that there was a sufficient notification sent both by mail, publishing in the Automotive News and in the Wall Street Journal.

The settlement the Court finds is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and there are a number of factors that the Court has to consider in determining that under Rule 23(e)(2), and I'm going to just briefly touch on them.

One is the likelihood of success, and clearly here the plaintiffs, though optimistic about their chance of success because of the pleas that were entered in this case, there was a difference in the amount of time -- the period the plea covered and what is asked for, and there is always much risk in litigation particularly weighed against the \$6.5 million that is being offered, and also the result appears to the Court to be one that is fair.

I also look at the complexity, expense, and likely duration. I don't think I need to go on with the likely duration because we are already seeing what that duration is in this case being some three years old, and as to other parts -- other -- well, other parts and other defendants, doesn't appear to be anywhere near the middle -- should I say nearer to the beginning? I don't know. So clearly -- and the complexity, just in the antitrust cases, extremely complex, but this one seems to be extremely complex given the

expansive nature.

The Court is aware also of the competency of counsel. Counsel is very experienced. And, again, I think this was mentioned here, there is counsel for the defendants individually and counsel for plaintiffs, and the Court knows that defendants have competent counsel as is the plaintiffs' counsel, so I have no question but that this was negotiated with great knowledge and wisdom of the collective counsel.

The discovery, of course, was extensive and would be even more extensive if this case were to go on. There has been no objections raised by any of the class members. The negotiations were taken at arm's length as these attorneys are experienced in litigating antitrust and other complex cases.

The public interest is served because these suits are notoriously difficult and unpredictable. The Court, in sum, finds that it is a fair and reasonable resolution.

The notice was proper. The Court did a preliminary approval of the notice, and the Court finds that that was proper, and I think that's a -- if you've heard from over 1,000 of the 1,300 and some -- or if the notices went out to over 1,000 of the 1,300 and some without return, I think that's particularly good. The Court has a list of the opt-outs which was attached to the order, we discussed some of those here today.

The Court -- also there has been a request for the distribution and the pro rata distribution plan has been approved by other courts, and I see no reason not to apply it in this case. It appears from the pleadings anyway that it would be a fair resolution. In fact, I don't know how else -- much else you could do it.

All right. The class should be certified at this point for purposes of effectuating the judgment. We have gone over these factors in the preliminary approval and the Court will just briefly repeat them. There's numerosity and commonality in this case, we have adequacy of representation, and there is a common question that predominates.

So for purposes of the settlement, the Court finds that the prerequisite for class actions pursuant to Rule 23 have been met and certifies the settlement class for direct purchaser plaintiffs. So the Court approves the settlement and it approves the distribution that has been proposed.

Now, we need to go on to I think another more difficult issue. You're going to tackle this one too, huh, Mr. Kohn?

MR. KOHN: Again, thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, with respect to the motion request for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses, we take the view that, you know, why are we doing it here but not in the IPC case where there is a settlement?

THE COURT: That's exactly what I was going to ask.

MR. KOHN: And our feeling among our group of counsel is that the time is right. When you can make a distribution to the class members, then it is appropriate for class counsel to request the Court to make a distribution to the lawyers for the class, and it is also appropriate and, indeed, necessary to have at least some determination because you need to determine what is the net amount of the fund that is available for the distribution.

So rather than have some sort of a reserve and a second distribution of some partial, we think it is appropriate for the Court to look at it as one package completes the fund. We are not seeking to reserve some portion of this fund to ask for additional fees later if we work on the case for another X amount of time and don't produce additional results. So we think that is a fairness to the class, it is appropriate when the clients are making their claims that the Court consider this issue.

Your Honor, we asked under the percentage of the recovery method, and we briefed that extensively, and the Sixth Circuit is aligned with the vast majority of the circuits that favors a percentage of the recovery method over the lodestar multiplier method, although you still have the right of the crosscheck as they call it, and we have requested 28.5 percent of the settlement fund. Now with the

reduction from the \$8 million figure to the \$6.5 million figure, because of the opt-outs for TRW, the net settlement fund now is \$42.1 million and the fee request at 28.5 percent is \$11,998,500, and that is the amount that we would respectfully request the Court to award.

We did cite many, many cases that have found, and studies, 30 to 33 percent is approved, it is approved in big cases over \$100 million, it was found to be the average in some studies. You know, we like the think the law is on our side in most of the arguments we make, but we cited in footnotes and string cites of case after case from all across the country and as, coincidentally, two from right on this very floor of this courtroom, from Judge Hood and Judge Cox, who had approved I think it was a 29 percent and a 30 percent fee in the Refrigerant Compressors case and the recent Blue Cross case.

Why do we come up with 28.5? Where does that number -- why aren't we asking for 30 or 33? Again, I think we are informed by a number of factors. The right of attorneys to request a fee from a common fund is a root and equitable doctrine, and we believe that it should be infused with a fairness to the clients to the class, a fairness to the class counsel. The courts of equity do not like windfalls and they do not like forfeitures and we try to look for an appropriate balance. Again, we could have filed a

brief that listed all of the 30 and 33 percent cases, but given everything that has happened in this case, given the relations we have with the class members, given the work and the time that has been expended on this particular piece of the broader litigation, we did not see any need to push the limit, if you will.

We placed a series of caps really on our request. In the notice that was sent out. We said any such request would not exceed 30 percent of the recovery, we wanted to be below that cap. We -- when you look at some of these percentages, we thought it was appropriate that the initial fee request with the \$8 million total amount would have come to \$12,426,000. We think it was appropriate that a fee not be than more that 12 and a half million, we wanted to come in a little -- 28.5 instead of 29 or 29.5.

The total multiplier when you use the lodestar crosscheck, there was over \$5 million of attorneys' time in the three years separated out into OSS. We have been recording and requesting the time separately on all of the different cases. We thought that multiplier should be less than 2.5, so that was a 2.47 multiplier.

When you have -- you know, at the 11,998,500 number, the multiplier is down to 2.3, 2.38. Our work is continuing on the case so that that multiplier is slowly going down as we continue to do the work as we will go

forward with the cooperation, et cetera.

So we think for all of those reasons, if we were negotiating with a major business client, if we were trustees of a trust, we think this is an appropriate and fair resolution, and we don't ever think it is appropriate to put some number out as a negotiating number and negotiate with the Court or negotiate with the class members. We try to present a number that we believe is an appropriate, fair and equitable number.

Each of these cases may be a little different. I think there is certainly a relationship and a tradeoff between the amount of the recovery and the percentage fee award, between that percentage and this multiplier lodestar crosscheck, so that if there is a case where there would only have been \$500,000 of work and this would translate to a multiplier of eight or ten, it wouldn't be appropriate to ask for that kind of percentage.

Conversely, if, you know, you're going to have a multiplier of one, you are basically just getting your time, perhaps the percentage would be appropriate to request something at a higher percentage. So we think each of these cases do stand on their own facts and their own issues, and we are not asking the Court to enter some sort of a ruling that would be cast in stone that in every case there should be a multiplier of 2.38 or there should be a percentage of X.

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One other additional matter, Your Honor, with respect to the request for reimbursement of costs, as we tried to make clear in the brief, you had granted approval to reserve a fund forward for additional expenses. Prior to that time there was out-of-pocket expenses by the various lawyers, not just the lead firms but the others who have helped as well, totalling \$145,044. We did disclose in the notice to the class members that that would be a request separate and additional to the fee request. The total of the fees and the costs requested is \$12,143,544, and that comes to 29 percent of the recovery, and we are pleased that between the fees and the costs, we are below that 30 percent cap that we voluntarily placed only the notice amount. So, Your Honor, I'm happy to answer, of course, the Court's questions. Again, we do also have a paper copy of the order as well as we filed an updated version electronically yesterday to reflect the revised total amount of the settlement amount because of the return to TRW. THE COURT: Right. MR. KOHN: We respectfully request approval of this matter as well. THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. MR. KOHN: THE COURT: I don't know, Mr. Iwrey, that you would have any comment or objections?

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               MR. IWREY:
                           Nothing additional from TRW.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. IWREY:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
               THE COURT:
                           I think the attorney fees are, of
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     course, the more difficult aspect of this. The Court looks
     at a number of factors in determining what to do.
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     know that it has to be a reasonable attorney fee, I think
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     that goes without saying, and the case law holds that and it
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                     The total settlement -- well, that changed.
     is very clear.
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     I was just trying to find my notes on that.
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                          $42.1 million, Your Honor.
               MR. KOHN:
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               THE COURT:
                          42.1?
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               MR. KOHN:
                          Yes.
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               THE COURT:
                           I'm going to have to excuse myself for
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     a minute because I don't have the second part of this motion.
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               THE LAW CLERK: All rise.
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               (At 1:59 p.m. court recessed.)
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               (At 2:01 p.m. Court reconvenes; Court, counsel and
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               all parties present.)
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               THE LAW CLERK: All rise. You may be seated.
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                           All right. 42.1 is the total.
               THE COURT:
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     The Court notes that there is two ways which we will refer
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     here today.
                 One is the percentage of the fund way and the
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     other one is the lodestar multiplier. I think that in
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looking at the lodestar multipliers, it is my experience that this is always the more difficult one to apply. First of all, you have the attorney fees, and as you know, I have been watching these attorney fees as they grew throughout this litigation, and looking at the hourly rates and the number of hours put in. And I would say, as I understand it, for this particular piece of the litigation, there is like 9,373 and a half hours put in. And that lodestar factor, originally it was 2.47, and now you said it was a little bit lower than that because of the reduction.

MR. KOHN: 2.38, Your Honor, is our -- my arithmetic.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court also notes in looking at the lodestar factor, I don't think that a court can say, one, your hours are too much unless there's some obvious glaring thing. I mean, I look at each individual entry, each individual entry is fine. But what I do know is that you charge on the hourly rate in this billing system, which so many attorneys hate where you have to keep track of every minute, that you do charge for every minute that you put into a litigation in a case such as this.

So the Court notes that what makes the lodestar -the lodestar, period, interesting in this case is that I
believe that counsel fairly and adequately recorded their
time so that they knew exactly how many hours in total

because I know you are getting a lot of this information from other lawyers that you are working with on this case, but that the Court assumes it's been adequately recorded and that it comes, as I said, to that 9,373 hours.

The Court notes that in the percentage of fund cases, the courts have approved various amounts up to 33 and a third, although I do think there was one case that was above that if I recall correctly, but these amounts differ depending on various factors, and frequently the lodestar multiplier in the end result is looked at as a crosscheck to see is the fee reasonable even using that particular factor.

The Court looks at the benefit to the class that plaintiffs' counsel secured, and here we know that there was a substantial sum of money that was secured and will be distributed amongst class members without any further risk or cost to any of them.

There is the lodestar crosscheck which the Court will address in just a minute. We know that there was risk involved in this case and we know that the plaintiffs undertake the case with the understanding that if they are not successful in getting any money, they will not be paid, which is a significant risk with the number of hours that goes into even getting the case started in the first place.

Society has an important stake in this lawsuit because it benefits from the resolution of the antitrust

suits, they benefit from the discovery of the antitrust and the resolution of the antitrust.

Another factor is the complexity of the case, and the Court is well aware of the complexity, I think we've talked about that before. It is not only an antitrust case, which is in any event a complex case, but it is a multitude of antitrust cases involving great difficulty, it involves even language difficulties with so much of the discovery coming out of Japan and other European countries, and it involves numerous members of the class, in this case some 1,300 class members.

The Court also looks at the skill and experience of counsel. I had a note here as to quality and quantity of counsel. Certainly we have an abundance of counsel on this case. The Court has said before and I will say again, it has been my experience that counsel are very well qualified, very professional, and are doing a very good job for all of -- for their clients.

I do want to know one thing as I looked at this, and this was part of the costs actually, and a number of the firms have this, and it is an assessment payment. What is an assessment payment? Is that to see if you are going take the case or not or what?

MR. KOHN: Your Honor, that is a payment that counsel make into a fund once the case is up and operating

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that is then used to pay common case expenses. So we are
not -- it is not used to pay a firm's individual travel time
or your own in-house photocopying.
         THE COURT: I knew you had a fund but I didn't know
this is what you meant.
                    Yes, for the expert witnesses, for those
         MR. KOHN:
kind of costs.
                    Thank you very much.
         THE COURT:
         MR. KOHN:
                    Okay.
         THE COURT:
                    Thank you. All right. So in looking
at that, the Court notes that plaintiffs are asking for --
your percentage again is --
         MR. KOHN:
                    28.5 percent.
         THE COURT:
                     Yeah. I didn't want to use the one
from the older.
                 28.5 percent of a $43.6 million -- well,
which is now $42.1 million settlement, and that comes to
$12,426,000.
                    Your Honor, please, that would have been
         MR. KOHN:
under the 43 --
         THE COURT:
                    The 28.5 percent factor, right?
         MR. KOHN:
                    The 28.5 percent of the 42.1 million
which remains in the fund is $11,998,500.
                     And, Counsel, you've spent time trying
         THE COURT:
to determine -- tell the Court why it was 28.5 percent versus
30 percent versus 20 percent.
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MR. KOHN: As I said, a series of caps we proposed. We didn't want to have the clients or the Court feel that we were trying to squeeze every conceivable dollar that could be approved under the case law. This actually now brings the fee under \$12 million, brings that multiplier, as we said, under the 2.4 number, and under all the circumstances we think it is a fair and reasonable application of that percentage, which is well within the range of the approved percentage, is well below many of the recent cases, and while it doesn't produce a round number fee of \$12 million, it comes in a few dollars below that.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that what would be fair -- first of all, with the costs, the Court approves the costs that you have submitted, I don't have any difficulty with any of those costs.

MR. KOHN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I do have a little difficulty with the percentage, and the reason is I looked at your crosscheck, the lodestar method, and it seems to me, since I believe you billed for every hour and every minute, that twice the amount of lodestar would be a fair and reasonable attorney fees as to anything, and the Court therefore is going to award a 25 percent of the total award as attorney fees. I have that as \$10,525,000. I would note on my calculation, and you can double-check this, it is basically a 2.09 lodestar factor.

MR. KOHN: Multiplier factor.

THE COURT: Multiplier. And the Court feels that at this point, given the magnitude of this litigation -- and I don't want this to be any precursor of things to come. I don't know where we are going with attorney fees in the future. Okay. I just tried to figure out what would be reasonable, what would you start with, and it just seems to me if I was confident that you accurately kept your hours, and I do, that twice the payment would be sufficient, and that comes to roughly 25 percent, and I think that that is a fair factor in this case.

So if you would present an order with that and the costs that have been asked and the Court will award it. I would say this. I do agree it is a time for distribution, and the reason I do agree is because now the plaintiffs are getting money. I don't think it is fair to give money to the attorneys, even though I know you have to continue the case, so that's certainly a factor towards fairness, but it just smells bad to give attorneys the money and not give the litigants something, and since you have this settlement that is final, I think it is a great opportunity to give the attorneys some fees because I know you are going to -- you put in the time and you are going to put in more time, so --

MR. KOHN: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anybody else have anything

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they want to say?
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 2
               (No response.)
 3
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
                                                                See
     you then in September. Okay.
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 5
               MR. KOHN:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
 6
               MR. IWREY:
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE LAW CLERK: Court is adjourned.
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               (Proceedings concluded at 2:12 p.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter of
4	the United States District Court, Eastern District of
5	Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28,
6	United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the
7	foregoing pages comprise a full, true and correct transcript
8	taken in the matter of In re Automotive Parts Antitrust
9	Litigation, Case No. 12-02311, on Tuesday, July 14, 2015.
10	
11	
12	s/Robert L. Smith
13	Robert L. Smith, RPR, CSR 5098 Federal Official Court Reporter United States District Court
14	Eastern District of Michigan
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17	Date: 08/07/2017
18	Detroit, Michigan
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